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This paper explores the apparent anomaly in the patenting strategies found in the 
agricultural biotechnology industry, when it is compared to the literature’s view of the 
patenting strategies in the general biotechnology industry and in the pharmaceutical 
industry in particular. By extending an extensive game model of the agriculture 
biotechnology industry, we show that, like the rest of the biotechnology industry, the 
integration of the agriculture biotechnology industry into several large private research 
firms with accompanying government laboratories can be transactions-costs limiting and 
thus efficient, given the existing institutional structure.  A review of the literature 
respecting the general biotechnology industry reveals an apparent anomaly between the 
general industry and our findings with respect to the Canadian agricultural biotechnology 
industry. The literature seems to suggest, as one might expect, that the choice of 
patenting strategy in the general industry is dependent upon a positive probability of 
litigation over opportunistic patenting strategies, with the probability of facing litigation 
being dependent on the type of patenting strategy adopted. In contrast, we found general 
opportunistic patenting strategies in the Canadian agricultural biotechnology industry, 
independent of potential litigation.  A comparison of the income elasticities of demand 
for food compared to other biotechnological products, particularly pharmaceuticals, can 
account for the apparent differences.  We briefly assess the policy implications of these 
observations, particularly examining why the manner in which publicly funded research 
programs compensate the inventors of the intellectual property that they control may limit 
the incentives for these programs to control the apparent opportunistic behavior we 
perceive in the agricultural biotechnology research sector. 
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Introduction 
 
In previous papers we have shown, in a static world with constrained government 
expenditure, that the granting of intellectual property rights (IPRs), while clearly a second 
best policy, are welfare enhancing (Phillips and Dierker, 2001; Dierker and Phillips 
2001).  We also showed, again in a static world, that while freedom to operate within the 
IPR system can be still further welfare enhancing, the failure to achieve freedom to 
operate continues to allow a Pareto improvement over a model in which there is no IPR 
system (Dierker and Phillips, 2001). Finally, we reported survey results that suggest that, 
within the Canadian agricultural biotechnology sector, those institutions designed to 
allow for freedom to operate have failed to provide the same (Dierker and Phillips, 2001). 
 
This paper commences by extending the game we offered in Dierker and Phillips (2001) 
to include vertical integration within the agricultural biotechnology research industry.  It 
then examines the concept that such integration, at the time of the integration, may be 
efficient, in that it is transaction costs limiting.  Finally, we examine the conditions under 
which, in economic theory, the efficient integration of the industry into several large 
vertically integrated firms can lead to an industry exhibiting marked levels of market 
power.   
 
The contrasts between the Canadian agricultural biotechnology research industry and the 
biotechnology industry more generally are then considered.  This examination has two 
principal foci.  First, the failure of the private firms in the Canadian agricultural 
biotechnology industry to provide the same level of freedom to operate, using the existing 
institutions, as the more general biotechnology industry will be examined.  It is posited 
that the differences can be accounted for either through differences in the income 
elasticities of demand for the consumer goods that result from the research, or by 
differences in the expected profits that can be derived through the research as a result of 
differences in consumer acceptance of the consumer goods that will result. Differences in 
these elasticities or consumer demand will, depending upon litigation costs, render 
different incentives for private firms to pursue freedom to operate through the existing 
institutions in the different industries.  Next, the incentive structure inherent in the 
manner that the publicly-funded research programs deal with inventors of intellectual 
property within the programs will be modelled.  This model will show that the policy 
adopted for compensating inventors in the publicly funded research programs provides 
incentives that, again depending upon litigation costs, are perverse to attempting to force 
freedom to operate through the existing institutional structure. 
 
Some Theoretical Considerations Relating to Agriculture’s Apparent Differences 
 
Extending the game from our previous paper (Dierker and Phillips, 2001) to include 
vertical integration in the agricultural biotechnology industry left an extensive form game 
that at its longest is twelve stages, and at its shortest is five stages.  The extended game 
has over a hundred potentially non-zero payouts.   
 
Once an innovator comes up with an innovation the innovator has the choice to apply for 
a patent or not.  If they chose not to apply for a patent they have to decide whether or not   3
to attempt to keep a trade secret.  If they elect not to attempt to keep the secret they can 
elect to either publish or not and following that decision to commercialize or not.  If they 
attempt to keep the secret and succeed then they must decide to commercialize or not, but 
run the risk of their competitors inventing around them and/or facing a take over.  If they 
cannot keep the secret they have to decide to litigate or not, while, if successful or not, 
still facing both the commercialization decision and the risk of take over. 
 
If the innovator opts to apply for a patent they have to decide on a patenting strategy.  
They can either act opportunistically, by doing something like seeking overly broad 
protection, or they can stay squarely within the four pillars of patentability.  In either case 
the patent office then gets to decide whether or not to grant the patent.  Subsequently the 
lawsuits can begin.  If the patent office does not grant the applicant can bring an 
administrative law action attempting to force the grant, or not.  Alternatively, if the patent 
office issues the patent the applicants’ competitors can challenge the grant, or not.  If the 
patent office refuses the grant and the inventor chooses not to sue, or sues and looses, or 
if the patent office issues the grant and a competitor successfully challenges the patent, 
the result will be the same as if the inventor was unsuccessful in keeping a trade secret.  
That is, the inventor would face the commercialization decision and the risk of takeover.  
If the patent office issues a patent and the inventor is either not sued or if sued wins, then 
the inventor would face a decision of whether to license or not. The ability of a patent 
holder to act opportunistically here is the root of a freedom to operate problem.  This 
decision is like the rest of the game followed by the decision to commercialize and the 
risk of takeover. 
 
The last complication to the game is the nature of the innovation.  That is, whether the 
innovation is major or minor.  A major innovation being one that allows the IP owner to 
extract monopoly rents, whereas a minor innovation is one that does not lower marginal 
cost sufficiently to allow for monopoly pricing and leaves the innovator pricing at his 
marginal cost, which should be lower than his competitors
3.   
 
A profit maximizing research firm is going to choose that strategy, in the game, that 
maximizes the firm’s profits.  As each node of the game, prior to the payout, has two 
options available to it, one of the events available off of any particular node is going to 
occur with some probability, p, between zero and one, while the other will occur with 
probability of one minus p.  For example from the invention node the innovator will 
choose to apply for a patent with some probability, while the probability that the 
innovator will not apply for a patent will be one minus the probability that he does.  Thus, 
these probabilities, both in terms of their absolute value and their relationship to each 
other are going to affect the choice of the optimal strategy to pursue in the game.  For 
example if the probability of being sued is slight, and the probability that the innovation 
is major and the probability that an opportunistic patent application will be granted are 
both substantial. Furthermore, if these probabilities are independent of each other, then a 
strategy where the innovator applies for a patent and acts opportunistically will dominate. 
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As well as the probabilities, the profits that an innovator can expect are going to depend 
upon the characteristics of the demand curve that the innovator faces.  Thus, the 
elasticities of demand are going to be important.  Regmi, Deepak, Seale and Bernstein 
(2001) in estimating price and income demand elasticities find that price changes prompt 
substitutions between food subgroups, and that poorer countries are more price 
responsive than richer countries.  Therefore, since the profit maximizing innovator is 
going to want to extract as much rent as possible, he is going to want to deal with the 
richer nations (i.e. there has to be some resources before the innovator can extract them), 
where the consumers apparently care relatively little about food prices.  Thus, from the 
innovators perspective income elasticities of demand may be more important.  Finally, 
consumers have to want to purchase the finished product off of the store shelf; if for 
whatever reason consumers are not willing to purchase the innovation, it is valueless.  
Therefore, it would seem that a profit maximizing potential innovator will only enter the 
agriculture biotechnology research industry if he perceives the probabilities, the 
elasticities and consumer attitudes as favourable.      
 
Is There Any Evidence of Agriculture’s Alleged Differences? 
 
At first blush there is very little reason to expect that the agricultural biotechnology 
industry significantly differs from the more general industry.  Both the general industry 
and the Canadian agricultural industry have displayed marked levels of concentration 
through mergers and acquisitions within the respective industries.  This has left several 
large private players occupying the core of the industry with numerous smaller, largely 
public research institutions on the fringes.  This merger mania has been accompanied by 
joint research projects being undertaken between the private firms and one or more of the 
public laboratories (Phillips and Dierker, 2001), and Phillips and Gustafson, 2000).  This 
concentration has led to concerns respecting freedom to operate with respect to 
intellectual property, particularly among the public institutions (Dierker and Phillips, 
2001).  Such concerns are by no means limited to Canadian agricultural biotechnology 
(Barton, 2000; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; and Lerner, 1994). 
 
Given these apparent similarities, wherein lie the differences?   Appendix A sets out a list 
of all the intellectual property right ownership law suits reported in electronically filed 
United States Security Exchange Commission forms 10-K, annual report to shareholders, 
filed through January of 2002, filed by or against the list of firms we report at Appendix 
B.  We excluded class action suits launched by producer groups alleging anti-competitive 
behavior and patent invalidity, and suits by the firms against individual producers 
attempting to enforce technology use agreements.  The hope of this far from exhaustive 
search technique was to gain a sense of whether or not the freedom to operate provision 
inherent in the United States Patent Act is being utilized by the firms listed in Appendix 
B.  Using the annual report to the shareholders will at least yield those lawsuits that the  
executives of the reporting firms believe place the firm at risk of financial jeopardy as a 
result of the lawsuit.  We subsequently had a colleague at the University of Saskatchewan 
Law School conduct a search of litigation databases available to the School. This search 
did not reveal any new intellectual property right ownership cases, although it did turn up   5
some builders’ liens.  Accordingly, while we cannot claim the list in Appendix B to be 
exhaustive, we have some confidence that it is representative.  So what does this tell us? 
 
In Dierker and Phillips (2001) we averred, from the survey data we had collected, that the 
probability of facing legal action is independent of the patenting strategy pursued, and 
appeared to approach zero.  That is, that an agricultural biotechnology research firm 
appeared, from the survey data to be no more likely to face legal action if they pursed an 
opportunistic patenting strategy (claiming as broad a patent as possible, a strategy that 
Lerner (1994) shows to enhance the value of the claiming firm) then if it was to pursue a 
strategy of claiming only those rights clearly within the four pillars of patentability: 
inventiveness; novelty; utility; and nonobviousness.  This contradicts the findings of 
Lerner (1994) who found the number of claims per patent, to be a significant predictor of 
patent ownership litigation.  It does however accord with Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2001)
4. The differences between these studies may be accounted for in that Lerner 
concerned himself solely with biotechnology.  An examination of the parties to the 
lawsuits revels that the litigants tend to fall into groups that have subsequently entered 
into mergers.  That is, the mergers appear to be between firms that were within a group of 
plaintiffs or a group of defendants but not between plaintiffs and defendants.  This would 
suggest that the mergers did not advance as a means of settling intellectual property rights 
ownership law suits.  Finally, there is a marked drop off in suit filings commencing in 
1997; incidentally this drop off precedes judgment in the Mycogen/Monsanto suit, the 
one really big award in the sample. 
 
Williamson (1986), in his work on governance, has shown that the type of organizational 
structure that you are going to observe in an industry is going to depend on the nature of 
the transactions between participants in the industry and the costs associated with those 
transactions.  The more asset specific an investment and the more difficult it is to observe 
and assess performance of a contract the more likely it is that a firm will move away from 
a market governance structure towards a vertically integrated governance structure.  
Williamson (1986) further argues that such a shift can be efficient because the vertically 
integrated structure allows the firm to escape the transactions costs inherent in a market 
governance structure.  Is biotechnological research and the resulting intellectual property 
a likely candidate to fall at the vertically integrated governance end of the spectrum?  For 
a profit maximizing private firm the research process relies heavily on some fairly 
specific human capital.  That is, you need the researchers with the good ideas.  Licensing 
agreements, according to our survey respondents, can be difficult and expensive to 
negotiate and enforce (some estimate that the minimum cost is $50K per license).  The 
same, again according to our survey respondents, is not true of cross licensing 
agreements.  These do, however, require that the parties to the negotiations have 
sufficient IP portfolios to be able to offer something of interest for what they are 
receiving.  Thus, the biotechnology industry generally, in an attempt to economize 
transaction costs, may have elected vertical integration until the point that each of the life 
science giants had achieved an IP portfolio that rendered cross licensing cheaper than 
further acquisition.  This would be consistent with the recently announced agreement 
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ownership litigation with the pharmaceutical industry being the highest.   6
between Dupont and Monsanto, involving several cross licensing agreements and the 
settling of the outstanding IP ownership suits between them
5 (AGNET, 2002).  This 
should not be taken to preclude the possibility that the large private firms hold and 
exercise market power, although it clearly shows that the present market structure is 
possible through firm profit maximization without collusion. 
 
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) demonstrated that for a position of market power to 
be sustainable it is necessary to have some barrier to entry in place.  Failing a barrier to 
entry the market becomes contestable and the threat of entry is sufficient to render a 
competitive outcome.  Thus, while profit maximization on the part of the individual firms 
is sufficient to create the current industry structure without collusion, it remains possible 
that the portfolios of IP held by the current private industry participants could form a 
barrier to entry and allow for the exercise of sustainable market power.  This possibility 
may underlie a great deal of the mistrust of the large life science firms in the popular 
press, particularly in the less developed world.  
 
Similarly the dearth of IP ownership litigation may also be explainable through firm 
profit maximization.  Since Adam Smith, economics has held that firms act to maximize 
profits.  Thus, the failure of firms to pursue an active litigation agenda suggests that the 
firms do not perceive litigation as profitable.  This can only occur if the expected benefits 
of litigation fail to exceed its costs.  Given that the same life sciences firms engage in 
litigation over IP ownership in their pharmaceutical division (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2001), while they appear to be hesitant to pursue a similar strategy in their agricultural 
biotechnology divisions, suggests that they must view the expected benefits differently.  
How dissimilar can the costs be to litigate the ownership of a gene whether it is used to 
create herbicide tolerance or to promote some anti cancer agent?  Intrinsically there 
would seem to be very little reason to expect the actual litigation costs to differ greatly, 
thus it would seem that the differences must lie with the expected value of the patents. 
 
Why might the expected value of agricultural biotechnology patents differ from 
biotechnology generally, and pharmacological biotechnology specifically?  Consider the 
income elasticities that Regmi, Deepak, Seale and Bernstein (2001) report, that is 
the percentage change in the quantity of a good demanded for a one percent change in 
income. It is relatively clear from the data in table 1 that people throughout the world are 
far more likely to part with their hard earned income for medical care than for food, 
which suggests that it should be unsurprising to find that the same corporations view their 








                                                        
5 The cynical reader could be forgiven for suspecting that fear of the United States’ Department of Justice 
was involved in the decision to cross license rather than merge.   7
Table 1: Budget shares and income elasticities of aggregate consumption categories 
 
Consumption 
categories                                      --- Budget shares ---                                    --- Income elasticity --- 
Low income   Middle income   High income   Low income      Middle income  High income 
<15% of U.S. 15-50% of U.S. >50% of U.S. <15% of U.S.    15-50% of U.S.    >50% of U.S. 
Food                                  0.47          0.29                     0.13                0.73                     0.58                      0.29 
Beverages & tobacco        0.04          0.05                     0.04                0.97                     0.97                      0.97 
Medical care                     0.04          0.08                      0.11               1.74                     1.35                       1.26 
Number of countries          32              41                         26                  32                       41                          26 
Source: Regmi, Deepak, Seale, and Bernstein (2001) 
 
But this can not be the complete answer.  Regmi et al (2001) argue that income 
elasticities for food are fairly stable over time.
6 They make the argument by comparison 
to 1980 estimates.  This suggests that there is nothing about the elasticities themselves 
that should lead one to expect litigation patterns with pronounced spikes.  Yet that is what 
we observe by plotting the number of law suits launched per year, reported in Appendix  
Source:  Search of SEC Electronically Filed Forms 10-K conducted in January 2002 
 
B, against time as we have done in figure 1.  
  
Figure 1 could be different depending upon how the two lawsuits launched in 1999 and 
joined with the 1996 action are classified.  In Figure 1 they are treated as separate cases.  
If they were treated as a correction of a 1996 oversight, the number of cases in 1999 
would drop to one from three. In either case the 1996 spike still raises questions about 
why there was a spike in 1996 and a sharp fall-off in litigation afterwards. It would seem 
that something might have occurred to prompt the industry to amend downward its 
expected profits. 
 
The questions then becomes is there anything else that suggests that 1996 might have 
wrought a change in the way in that the private agriculture biotechnology industry 
viewed the world?  Should there be any additional evidence the question then becomes: 
what occurred about 1996 that might account for a change in view on the part of the 
                                                        
6 The interested reader should see table B-2 in their paper. 
Fi gure 1:  Agri cul t ural  























industry?  The graph of canola patent applications between 1985 and 1999, shown in 
figure 2, does not rule out that something monumental may have occurred in 1996.   If 
patent applications are a lagged function of expected profits and if something occurs in 
1996 to call future profits into question, patent applications, analogously to the decision 
to litigate, could be expected to fall off as they did. 
 
Source: Search for canola related processes and products in CIPO Canadian Patent 
Database, December 1999 
 
What happened in 1996?  The phenomenon that springs immediately to mind is the 
British, so-called, “mad cow disease” scare.  The accompanying rise in consumer distrust 
of food safety regulators may suggest an answer.  The EuroBarometer 2000 Summary 
Report after setting out that the European Union has witnessed a “significant decline in 
trust of all sources of biotechnology information”, from its 1993 apex, goes on to 
conclude: 
 
4 Support for GM crops has declined since 1996. However, support for 
medical applications of modern biotechnology in the areas of 
pharmaceuticals and genetic testing remains high, and does not appear to 
have been affected by the controversies over GM crops and foods. Even the 
potentially controversial use of cloning techniques for human cells and 
tissues attracts moderate support. Hence the lower expectations for the 
future regarding biotechnology is as a result of attitudes towards particular 
applications and not to gene technology as a whole.  
5 Food production is regarded as that application of biotechnology carrying 
the greatest risk, whereas the detection of diseases the least.  
 
Industry has to be aware of these declines. It would seem that consumer acceptance of the 
final food products has to be a key element of the industry’s expected profits function, 
and that expectations of profits must surely have begun to fall from 1993 levels in 1996 
Figure 2:  Annual Canola Patent 




































# patents  9
and may well have continued to fall.  This suggests that rationally formed expectations of 
profits are likely higher for pharmacological patents than for agricultural patents, based 
not only on elasticities of demand, but on consumer acceptance as well.  If one cannot 
sell their products in Europe, what are one’s expected profits?   
  
If profit maximization provides a rational reason for private investors to fail to fully 
utilize the freedom to operate provisions open to them, why would the public sector, a 
significant player in this game, not intervene to insure freedom to operate?  This query 
has two potential answers.  The first is that the public sector does not perceive there to be 
a freedom to operate problem.  This proposition is belied by our survey responses, which 
suggest that the public sector research institutions perceive serious freedom to operate 
problems.  The second is that the structure of public sector research initiatives and the 
manner in which public sector researchers are compensated for developing IP combine to 
render the transaction costs of generating freedom to operate beyond the benefit that any 
single public sector research institution perceives from increased freedom to operate. 
 
Public sector research institutions tend to have three things in common. First, they tend to 
be, all things considered, relatively small, particularly compared to their private 
counterparts.  Second, they tend to reward innovation by paying some percentage of the 
licensing fees they receive for their IP to those individuals who developed the innovation 
(Phillips and Gustafson, 2000).  Third, they tend to face both financial and personnel 
constraints (Phillips and Dierker, 2001). While preserving freedom to operate is Pareto 
improving (Dierker and Phillips, 2001), the fact that we fail to observe the public sector 
acting to do so suggests that individual public research institutions’ managers see the 
benefits to their individual research institution being superceded by the litigation costs 
associated with using the legal system to enforce freedom to operate. IP litigation is 
expensive, both in terms of financial outlay and employee time.  Our survey results 
indicated that the public sector institutions have generally not been as successful as they 
would like at cross licensing, the preferred way to transfer technology in the industry – 
cross licenses have fewer enforcement problems as both parties to the license have an 
incentive (access to technology they need) to not cheat.  Several of the respondents 
attributed part of the blame for this limited success to the compensation structure for the 
researchers that the institutions employ and the somewhat fractured nature of the public 
research sector.  In essence the complaints centered on the difficulty involved in putting 
together a portfolio of IP that will be attractive in the cross license market place.  
According to our survey, a credible cross licensing agreement would involve attaining the 
consent of numerous different individual researchers, who may well work in several 
different individual public institutions, whose best interest is served by a cash license (the 
individual researchers typically get a percentage of any cash license) rather than by a 
cross license, which may or may not give them access to IP that can be used to further 
their own research agenda. Colloquially, it is difficult to get people to “take one for the 
team.” In economic terms the fractured structure of the public research effort and the 
method of researcher compensation have established an institutional structure where the 
transactions costs of entering into cross-licensing agreements are high enough to largely 
drive the public sector out of the cross-licensing marketplace. 




If the above observations contain some merit—and we are not on the corner of the map 
that a middle ages cartographer would have, in beautiful calligraphy, marked with the 
warning “hic dragones”—some implications flow. 
 
If the fall off in canola patent applications and in patent ownership litigation are 
indicative of concern in the private sector about profitability in the agricultural 
biotechnology research sector, and not due to the fact that they have found everything 
they think they need and are really very happy with the status quo, the implications for 
the industry could be profound.  It is axiomatically true in economics that firms are profit 
maximizers.  Thus if there are no expected profits there is likely to be very little private 
investment.  If private investment completely leaves the agricultural biotechnology 
research industry freedom to operate concerns may be a moot issue.  Patents have limited 
lives, and some of the earlier agricultural biotechnology patents are approaching the end 
of those lives.  Thus, if there is no further private investment aimed at improving the 
technology contained in these lapsing patents, the world of agricultural research could 
return to a state of largely public goods research, unless, of course, the public sector 
research institutions continue to seek IP protection.  Such a strategy may have some 
appeal, particularly for developing countries who could develop new technology, patent 
in wealthier countries and recover some of their development costs through patent rents.  
This would require that consumer acceptance is not going to become a problem in at least 
some of the developed nations and that this form of price discrimination is not going to 
cause trade problems that render such a strategy too costly. 
 
Before dusting off the textbooks that address how to ensure an efficient supply of public 
goods, it should be recalled that consumer rejection, and particularly European Union 
consumer rejection, underpins the above argument.  Should current concerns over GM 
foods dissipate, particularly before all of the present technology enters the public domain, 
it may be that expected profits could prove high enough, particularly given the current 
structure of the industry, to bring forth substantial private investment and therefore give 
rise to heightened freedom to operate problems.  While the current trend in Europe seems 
clearly to be toward ever increasing consumer resistance, that is not a certainty. Should 
some highly desirable output trait come along, it is conceivable that consumer attitudes 
could transform, almost literally, over night.  Should that occur, economic theory would 
predict that a highly concentrated private sector would act to protect an asset that has 




The agricultural biotechnology research industry is different from the general 
biotechnology research industry, and particularly different from the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Given the differences in elasticities of demand, agricultural biotechnological 
research is never going to have the profit potential of pharmaceutical research.  Given 
this, the incentives for private participants in the industry to vigorously attempt to force   11 
freedom to operate are never going to be as great in the agricultural sector as they are in 
the pharmaceutical sector.  This also suggests that the incentive for private participants in 
the industry to act rapaciously, if only just a little, are going to be greater in the 
agricultural sector.  This can potentially take two forms.  First, patent applicants are 
likely to seek opportunistically broad protection.  Second, competitors of the patent 
holders are going to be more likely to infringe, knowing that, if the expected profits are 
low enough, the holder has a far greater incentive to license than to sue.  Finally, all of 
this hinges on consumer acceptance of the final food products that arise out of the system.  
Should consumer acceptance continue to wane, private research and development 
investment could be driven from the industry.  Alternatively, should consumer 
acceptance begin to rise, expected profits will rise and private firms should be more 
inclined to protect their own rights and challenge the rights of their competitors.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
PLAINTIFF    DEFENDANT   YEAR 
 
Enzo     Calgene     1993 
 
  Mycogen    Monsanto     1994 
 
 Plant  Genetic  Systems  NV  Mycogen     1995 
 
Monsanto Inc.     DNA Plant Technology Inc.    1995 
 
Mycogen    Monsanto     1995 
 
Mycogen    Monsanto     1995 
 
Mycogen    Monsanto     1996 
 
Mycogen    Monsanto,  DeKalb 
    &  Delta  Pineland    1996 
 
DeKalb   Hoechst     1996 
 
DeKalb   Pioneer  Hi-Bred  Int. 
      & Mycogen      1996 
 
 Plant  Genetic  Systems   DeKalb    1996 
 
 DeKalb   Northrop  King  Co.    1996
1 
 
  DeKalb      Pioneer Hi-Bred Int. & Mycogen  1996
1 
 
 DeKalb   Becks  Hibrids   
     &  Country  Mark  Co-operative  Inc.  1996
1 
 




 Mycogen    Ecogen    1997 
 
 AgrEvo   DeKalb    1997 
 
 Rhone-Poulenc  DeKalb    1997 
 
 Zeneca     Monsanto     1998 
                                                        
1 Consolidated   14 
 
  Pioneer Hi-Bred Int.    Cargill, Asgrow Seeds 
                  &  DeKalb      1998 
 
 Novartis    Monsanto  &  DeKalb    1998 
 
 Monsanto    Novartis     1999
2 
 
  Pioneer Hi-Bred Int.    Monsanto, DeKalb 
     &  Novartis     1999
3 
 
 DeKalb   Pioneer  Hi-Bred  Int.    1999
3 
 
 Mycogen    Monsanto  Australia  Ltd. 
     &  Delta  Pine  Australia  Ltd.   1999
4  
 
 Aventis   Novartis     2000
2 
 
                                                        
2 Settled within a year 
3 Joined with 1996 action in an apparent attempt to correct a erroneous filing 
4 Litigating in Australia, under its Patent Act, a question largely settled in the United States   15 
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9.  Delta & Pineland 
10. Hoechst 
11. Plant Genetic Systems 
12. Northrop King 
13. Becks Hibrids 
14. Country Mart Co-opertive 
15. Agrevo 
16. Rhone Poulanc 
17. Pharmeca 
18. Dow 
 
 